Abstract. In the first part of this paper, we prove a minimax inequality for maps satisfying a generalized coercivity type condition. As a consequence, we prove a result on the solvability of complementarity problems. In the second part, a result on the existence of maximal element in non-compact domains is obtained and as application, we prove the existence of equilibrium for an abstract economy (or generalized game) with non-compact choice sets.
Introduction
This paper is a study of minimax inequality and equilibrium for maps satisfying a "coercivity" type condition. We firstly recall the notion of coercing family for set-valued maps (also called correspondences) defined by Ben-El-Mechaiekh, Chebbi and Florenzano in [2] . As an example, we give the very general coercivity condition obtained by Ding and Tan in [5] .
In Section 2, we prove a minimax inequality for maps satisfying a generalized quasi-concavity condition and a coercivity type condition. Our result extends the minimax inequality obtained by Yen [11] to non-compact domains and generalizes also the minimax inequalities obtained in the noncompact case by Fan [6] and Ding and Tan [5] . As a consequence, we extend results on complementarity problems obtained by Karamardian [8] and Allen [1] .
In Section 3, we prove the existence of maximal elements for preferences correspondences defined on non-compact subsets of a topological vector space and satisfying a coercivity type condition. As application, we prove an equilibrium existence result for generalized game (or abstract economy) with non-compact choice sets. The results of this section generalize corresponding results obtained in Borglin and Keiding [4] , Toussaint [9] , Tulcea [10] and Ding and Tan [5] .
Throughout the paper, vector spaces are real and topological (vector) spaces are assumed to be Hausdorff. The convex hull of a subset A of a vector space is denoted by co A, the closure of a subset A of a topological space is denoted by cl A and for any set X, X denotes the family of all non-empty finite subsets of X.
Let X be a subset of a topological vector space, Y a topological space and F : X → Y be a correspondence. In order to define the setting of this paper, we need the following definition given in [2] :
} i∈I of pair of sets is said to be coercing for F if and only if: (i) For each i ∈ I, C i is contained in a compact convex subset of X and
For any correspondence F : X → Y , let F * : Y → X be the "dual" correspondence of F defined by F * (y) = X \ F −1 (y). Using the following equivalent formulation, we can easly see that (iii) is a coercivity type condition: Remark 1. Let X be a subset of a topological vector space and F : X → Y be a correspondence. A family {(C i , K i )} i∈I of pair of sets is coercing for F if and only if it satisfies conditions (i), (ii) of Definition 1 and the following one: Note that in case where the family is reduced to one element, condition (C) appeared first in this generality (with two sets K and C) in [3] and generalizes condition of Karamardian [8] and Allen [1] . Condition (C) is also an extension of the coercivity condition given by Fan [6] . Fore more examples about correspondences admitting a coercing family (when I is a singleton), see [2] . By the following example, we can see that the notion of coercing family is very general: Example 1. If F : X → X is a correspondence satisfying the following condition given in [5] : There exists X 0 contained in a compact convex subset of X and K a compact subset of X such that:
Then F admits a C-coercing family.
Proof. Take the family:
where for each y ∈ X \K and for each A y ∈ X , C Ay = co(X 0 ∪A y ). This family verifies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1, by putting A y = {y} for every y ∈ X \ K, condition C is satisfied.
Minimax inequalities
Let us recall that if X is a subset of a vector space Y , a correspondence
The following minimax inequality is an equivalent analytic formulation of Theorem 3.1 in [2] :
(c) There exists a family {(C i , K i )} i∈I satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 and the following one: For each i ∈ I, there exists k ∈ I such that:
Proof. For each x ∈ X, let F (x) = {y ∈ X : f (x, y) ≤ 0}. We have to show that F satisfies all conditions of Theorem 3.1 in [2] . By (a), F (x) is compactly closed in X for each x ∈ X. If F is not KKM, there exist A ∈ X and y ∈ co A such that f (x, y) > 0 for all x ∈ A, which contradicts (b). Condition (c) implies that F admits a coercing family, it follows that
Theorem 1 extends Theorem 6 of Fan [6] . Using Example 1, Theorem 1 is also a generalization of Theorem 1 in [5] . 
Corollary 1. Let X be a non-empty convex subset of a topological vector
space E and f, g : X × X → R ∪ {−∞, +∞} be such that: (i) For each (x, y) ∈ X × X, f (x, y) ≤ g(x, y). (ii) For each x ∈ X, g(x, x) ≤ 0. (iii) For each fixed x ∈ X, the function: y → f (x,{y ∈ X : f (x, y) ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ C k } ⊂ K i .
Then there exists y
Proof. It is sufficient to show that (i), (ii) and (iv) imply condition (b) of Theorem 1. If not, there exist A ∈ X and y ∈ co A such that min x∈A f (x, y) > 0. Then by (i), min x∈A g(x, y) > 0. It follows by (iv) that g(y, y) > 0, which contradicts (ii).
The following minimax inequality, which includes a generalization of Theorem 1 of Yen [11] , can be deduced from Corollary 1:
Corollary 2. Let X be a non-empty convex subset of a topological vector space E and f, g : X × X → R ∪ {−∞, +∞} be such that: 
Then the following minimax inequality holds:
Proof. We can assume that λ = sup x∈X g(x, x) is finite, otherwise there is nothing to prove. The functions f − λ and g − λ satisfy conditions of Corollary 1, then there exists
Hence the minimax inequality follows.
The following extension of Theorem 3.1 of Karamardian [8] on the solvability of complementarity problems follows immediately from Theorem 1: (ii) There exists a family {(C i , K i )} i∈I satisfying conditions (i), (ii) of Definition 1 and the following one: For each i ∈ I, there exists k ∈ I such that:
If moreover X is a cone and if X 0 denotes the polar cone of X, then −f (y * ) ∈ X 0 and f (y * ), y * = 0.
Equilibria in an abstract economy
Correspondences play a central role in the theory of economic equilibria. They usually represent preference relations (the value P (x) of a correspondence P consists of all those commodities preferred to x). The issue there is to determine the existence of a so-called maximal element for a given preference P , i.e. an elementx with P (x) = ∅. Definition 3. Using the terminology of Borglin and Keiding [4] , given a map P : X → X of a non-empty subset X of a topological vector space, we say that:
Remark 2. The concept of KF majoration is hereditary in the sense that it becomes global in the presence of paracompactness. More precisely, if a correspondence P : X → X is KF -majorized and if X is paracompact, then P is majorized by a KF correspondence Ψ, i.e., P (x) ⊆ Ψ(x), ∀x ∈ X (see [4] ).
Theorem 3.2 in [2] can be rephrased in terms of the existence of maximal elements as follows: Proposition 1. Let X be a non-empty convex and paracompact subset of a topological vector space. A correspondence P : X → X admits a maximal element provided that it is KF -majorized and has a C-coercing family.
Proof. Suppose that, for all x ∈ X, P (x) = ∅. Since P is KF -majorized and X is paracompact, it follows from Remark 2 that there exists a KF correspondence Ψ such that P (x) ⊆ Ψ(x), ∀x ∈ X. By Theorem 3.2 in [2] , the correspondence co Ψ admits a maximal element, which is also a maximal element for P .
Theorem 1 in [5] follows from Example 1 and Proposition 1:
Corollary 4. Let X be a non-empty convex and paracompact subset of a topological vector space and P : X → X a KF -majorized correspondence. If P satisfies the following coercivity condition: There exist X 0 contained in a compact convex subset of X and K a compact subset of X such that:
Then P admits a maximal element.
Let now J be a (possibly infinite) set of agents. We consider the situation where each agent j ∈ J has a non-empty choice set (or strategy set) X j and a preference correspondence P j : X = j∈J X j → X j such that x j / ∈ P j (x), x ∈ X. Following Gale and Mas-Colell [7] , we say that the collection (X j , P j ) j∈J is a qualitative game.
Using Proposition 1, we obtain the following existence result for qualitative games: Proposition 2. Let (X j , P j ) j∈J be a qualitative game such that the set X = j∈J X j is paracompact and satisfying the following conditions for each j ∈ J:
(i) X j is a non-empty convex subset of a topological vector space E j .
Then the game (X j , P j ) j∈J has an equilibrium.
Proof. For each x ∈ X, let J(x) = {j ∈ J : P j (x) = ∅}. Define Φ : X → X by:
where P j : X → X is defined by: y ∈ P j (x) ⇐⇒ y j ∈ P j (x). Using (ii), (iii), a standard argument (see [9] ) shows that Φ is KF -majorized. Hypothesis (iv) implies that Φ admits a C-coercing family. Hence, there exists an x ∈ X such that Φ(x) = ∅ i.e. P j (x) = ∅ for all j ∈ J.
More generally, if each agent j is restricted in his choices to some nonempty subset of his strategy set due to the actions of the other players; this is formalized in terms of a constraint correspondence B j : X → X j . The family (X j , B j , P j ) j∈J is called a generalized qualitative game or an abstract economy. We say that x ∈ X is an equilibrium of the game if for each j ∈ J: Proof. For each j ∈ J, let F j = {x ∈ X : x j / ∈ cl X j B j (x)}. The set F j is open in X by (iv). Define Q j : X → X by:
We can also show by a standard argument (see [9] ) that the qualitative game (X j , Q j ) j∈J satisfies the hypotheses (i)-(iii) of Proposition 2. By (vii) Q j admits a C-coercing family. We conclude that the qualitative game (X j , Q j ) j∈J admits an equilibrium x. Since B j (x) is non-empty for all x ∈ X, this implies that for each j ∈ J, x j ∈ cl X j (B j (x)) and B j (x) ∩ P j (x) = ∅.
Proposition 3 generalizes Theorem 4 in [5] . If X j is compact for each j ∈ J, then Proposition 2 reduces to Corollary 3 in [4] , Theorem 2.5 in [9] and Proposition 3 in [10] .
